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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a scenario where the police arrest and charge two women with a
string of connected robberies.1 Both women are twenty years-old and have very
little money and no criminal record.2 Despite this lack of criminal history and
money, the judge orders detention until trial unless each one can pay the $150,
000 bail set by that same judge. 3 Ultimately, one woman secures release from
jail.4 She manages to reduce her charges from felony robbery to a lesser offense
of simple theft with the possibility of dismissal within a year upon the
completion of probation and community service. 5
The other woman, in a situation identical to the first, remains in jail. 6 Under
the taxing conditions of the jail—poor sanitation, bad food, little chance for
recreation or fresh air—she accepts the prosecutor’s plea deal. 7 While the deal
allows her to return to her son, it also burdens her with two felony counts of
robbery, five years of probation, and a seven-year suspended sentence—any
misstep with the criminal justice system will send her directly to prison. 8
This disparity caused only by the ability to pay bail portrays the real-life
experience of Daria Morrison, Sarah Jackson, and others like them. 9 The first
woman, Daria, had financial support from her family and secured release from
jail with the help of a bail bondsmen. 10 Free from pretrial detention, Daria
defended her case with an attorney’s help, which led to the revelation that neither
woman had actively participated in the robberies.11 This revelation led to Daria’s

1. John Raphling, California Ended Cash Bail—But May Have Replaced It with Something Worse:
Racist Algorithms and Unlimited Judicial Discretion Threaten to Increase Pretrial Incarceration in California,
HUM. R TS. WATCH (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/24/california-ended-cash-bail-mayhave-replaced-it-something-even-worse (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. HUM . RTS. WATCH, “NOT IN IT FOR J USTICE”: HOW CALIFORNIA’S PRETRIAL DETENTION AND BAIL
SYSTEM UNFAIRLY PUNISHES POOR PEOPLE 68 (2017), https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/04/11/not-itjustice/how-californias-pretrial-detention-and-bail-system-unfairly (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
3. Ralphling, supra note 1.
4. HUM . RTS. WATCH, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Ralphling, supra note 1.
8. HUM . RTS. WATCH, supra note 2.
9.
See,
e.g.,
Nick
Pinto,
The
Bail
Trap,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
13,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law School) (“In June [2015], Sandra Bland was found dead in her cell in Texas after failing to come up with
$500 for her release”).
10. HUM . RTS. WATCH, supra note 2.
11. Id.
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reduced charges and allowed her to return to her waitressing job. 12 She can now
continue her hopes of becoming a lawyer. 13
Sarah, however, remained incarcerated for three months without a resolution
of her case and finally accepted a guilty plea for a time-served sentence under
which she could leave immediately.14 She did so because she could not afford to
pay her $150,000 bail, which the judge set so high in part due to the prosecutor’s
argument that she was too dangerous to release pretrial. 15 Choosing a different
option would cause Sarah to lose her job resulting in myriad collateral
consequences—the worst of which would be separation from her child. 16
Although the deal allowed her to reunite with her son, it also left her with two
felony counts of robbery—both of which constitute a “strike” under California’s
“three strikes” law.17
Sarah and Daria’s case is hardly unique. 18 Many other stories demonstrate the
life-altering impacts of pretrial detention for those who are unable to afford the
bail amount the judge, prosecutor, or bail schedule determine is appropriate. 19
Jurisdictions across the country have experimented with bail reform since the
1960s, but those reforms produced mixed results and occurred in scattered
jurisdictions.20 To address the root cause of a broken bail system, California
Governor Jerry Brown signed the Money Bail Reform Act (“SB 10”) in August
2018, effectively ending the state’s reliance on cash bail.21 This move followed
efforts in a number of other states to reduce their reliance on cash bail, but
California became the first to completely foreclose its use. 22

12. Ralphling, supra note 1.
13. Id.
14. HUM . RTS. WATCH, supra note 2.
15. Ralphling, supra note 1.
16. Id.
17. Id.; THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF C ALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA’S THREE STRIKES SENTENCING LAW 3
(2019), available at https://www.courts.ca.gov/20142.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (“The essence of the Three Strikes law was to require a defendant convicted of any new felony, having
suffered one prior conviction of a serious felony to be sentenced to state prison for twice the term otherwise
provided for the crime”).
18. See Eyder Peralta, Kalief Browder, Jailed for Years Without Trial, Kills Himself, NPR (June 2015)
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/06/08/412842780/kalief-browder-jailed-for-years-at-rikersisland-without-trial-commits-suicide (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Kalief Browder,
the young man who was held for years in a New York jail without a trial, killed himself on Saturday. . ..Because
his family was unable to raise his $10,000 bail [for allegedly stealing a backpack], Browder languished at
Rikers Island for three years awaiting trial”).
19. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 2 (highlighting the ramifications of pretrial detention that are
common to many detainees).
20. Stephanie Wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of Unconvicted People from Jail,
Explained, VOX (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/17/17955306/bail-reformcriminal-justice-inequality (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
21. Alexei Koseff, Jerry Brown Signs Bill Eliminating Money Bail in California, SACRAMENTO BEE
(Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article217461380.html (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
22. See GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW CENTER FOR ACCESS TO J USTICE,
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SB 10’s supporters hope that the law will reduce unnecessary detainments
before trial in the state and also alleviate the harsh effects felt by the groups the
current bail regime disproportionately victimizes. 23 However, civil rights
activists, victims’ rights advocates, and the bail industry have launched an attack
on the law. 24 Critics argue that the passage of SB 10 was too hasty and will have
unintended consequences.25
While the groups differ markedly on their concerns with the law, most in
opposition can agree—albeit for different reasons—that the risk assessment
systems (“RAS”) on which the law relies should not be the foundation of bail
reform in California or across the nation. 26 In fact, under such a system, a chance
exists that the court would release neither Sarah or Daria.27 Instead, an RAS
likely would have detained them pretrial without bail due to a combination of
factors including their charge, age, and where they lived. 28
Because supporters of the bail bonds industry collected enough signatures to
put a referendum on the 2020 ballot seeking to prevent the implementation of SB
10, only time will tell whether the law will materialize. 29 It is heartening that
California can use other jurisdictions’ responses to the problems associated with
cash bail as examples,30 but California’s unique political and social landscape
will make the implementation of a system that goes farther quite difficult. 31 As
MISDEMEANOR
BAIL
REFORM
AND
LITIGATION:
AN
O VERVIEW
1–10
(Sept.
2017),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=d935d1e1
-80a-3314-bf2a-bbefde49285f&forceDialog=0 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(providing an overview of the most recent bail reform movements across the United States and the measures
those jurisdictions have taken to reduce reliance on cash bail).
23. Bob Egelko, Gov. Jerry Brown Signs Bill Eliminating California’s Cash-Bail System, SFGATE (Aug.
29, 2018), https://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Gov-Jerry-Brown-signs-bill-eliminating-13188659.php (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
24. Meagan Flynn, California Abolishes Money Bail With a Landmark Law. But some Reformers Think It
Creates New Problems, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2018/08/29/c. . .reformers-think-it-creates-new-problems/?utm_term=.8d3a0ea5423c (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law School); Sheyanne Romero, Human Rights Advocates, Bail Industry Leaders
Fight
to
Stop
No
Cash
Bail
Law,
VISALIA
TIMES
DELTA
(Dec.
28,
2018),
https://www.visaliatimesdelta.com/story/news/2018/12/28/human-rights-advocates-bail-industry-leaders-fightoverturn-sb-10/2415570002/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
25. Romero, supra note 24.
26. See generally John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the
Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. EV. 1727 (Dec. 2018) (highlighting the main underlying challenges with
risk assessment systems leading to the conclusion that they should be hesitantly embraced).
27. Ralphling, supra note 1.
28. Id.
29. Jazmine Ulloa, California’s Historic Overhaul of Cash Bail is Now on Hold, Pending a 2020
Referendum, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-bail-overhaul-referendum20190116-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
30. Youngjin Choi, Lessons From California and New Jersey Bail Reform Legislation, N.Y. L.J. (Dec.
07, 2018), https://www.law.com/neewyorklawjournal/2018/12/07/lessons-from-californa-and-new-jersey-bailreform-legislation/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
31. See George Skelton, Why We Need Bail Reform: California Shouldn’t Be Requiring a Payment for
Freedom, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-skelton-bail-reform20180226-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (demonstrating that California has
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such, the passage of SB 10 should be the beginning, rather than the end, of the
conversation surrounding what works best for California in terms of bail
reform.32
This comment argues that regardless of a jurisdiction’s given bail method,
the law should mandate consultation and cooperation with community-based
organizations regarding the appropriate procedures for pretrial detention if those
states choose to eliminate cash bail. 33 Part II provides a brief background
surrounding the history and purpose of bail and its subsequent effects. 34 Part III
then demonstrates that the signed version of SB 10 does not accomplish the goals
of reducing flight risk and promoting public safety and fails to safeguard
defendants’ rights. 35 Part IV argues that community-based organizations are
essential to garner substantive change with lasting effect. 36 Part V concludes that,
to restore integrity to California’s bail reform movement, the legislature should
require input from the voices of community-based and grassroots
organizations—many of which the drafters of SB 10 ultimately excluded—to
ensure the success of SB 10’s goals. 37
II. CASH BAIL AND A BRIEF HISTORY OF REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES
Understanding the current problems associated with bail reform requires an
understanding of how the function and use of bail has changed throughout the
history of the United States.38 Section A explains the history and purpose of cash
bail in the United States.39 Part B then explains the negative repercussions of
cash bail and the pretrial detention that occurs when a defendant cannot pay that
bail.40
A. What is the History and Purpose of Cash Bail?
Bail, in general, refers to the practice of releasing defendants pretrial and has
existed in Anglo-Saxon legal systems for hundreds of years.41 Bail’s original
intent was to ensure the appearance of the defendant at trial.42 Courts placed little
been struggling to enact meaningful bail reform since Governor Brown’s 1979 State of the State address).
32. Infra Part VII.
33. Infra Part VI.
34. Infra Part II.
35. Infra Part III.
36. Infra Part IV.
37. Infra Part V.
38. See Wykstra, supra note 20 (providing a brief history of bail in order demonstrating how that history
prompted and informs the current bail reform movement).
39. Infra Section II.A.
40. Infra Section II.B.
41. SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN AMERICA’ S
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 18 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017) (ebook).
42. Lauren Kelleher, Out on Bail: What New York Can Learn from D.C. About Solving a Money Bail
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focus on the accused’s guilt or the likelihood that he would commit a crime
before trial while released. 43
Although defendants may obtain bail through a number of methods,
jurisdictions across the country have increasingly employed the use of money
bail.44 Under the money bail regime, a judge sets bail at an amount that is
“reasonably calculated” to ensure the appearance of the defendant at trial.45 At
the outset of the country’s criminal justice system, only those accused of a capital
offense could not receive bail and the courts presumed release for all others. 46
Starting in the 1940s, the presumption of release’s original intention as the
norm under the bail system began to erode as judges unofficially started to weigh
flight risk and other substantive evidence with no connection to that risk. 47
Congress codified this change in policy with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
46.48 The change allowed the courts to consider the “weight of the evidence
against [the defendant]” as well as the “characteristics of the [defendant]” when
determining bail. 49 The policy gave judges substantial discretion and resulted in
an increase in the number of pretrial detentions in the United States. 50 In many
cases, pretrial detention resulted not because of a defendant’s objective danger to
the community or his high probability of flight risk, but because a judge set bail
at an amount higher than the defendant could afford, sometimes based on the
judge’s own subjective motivations.51
As early as the 1960s, political leaders understood the consequences of
money bail in practice.52 For example, President Johnson proclaimed that the
poor defendant “languishes in jail weeks, months, and perhaps even years. . . not
because he is guilty. . . [but] because he is poor.”53 In a nationwide effort to
reduce pretrial incarceration related to the imperfect bail system, Congress
enacted the Bail Reform Act of 1966.54 To reduce the disproportionate effect
money bail had on poor communities, the law allowed a judge to exercise
discretion to detain a defendant if release would not “reasonably assure the

Problem, 55 AM . CRIM. L. REV. 799, 802 (2016).
43. Id.
44. JUST. POL’ Y INST., BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD END THE PRACTICE OF USING MONEY FOR
BAIL
(Sept.
2012),
available
at
www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/bailfail_executive_summary.pdf (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
45. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
46. BAUGHMAN, supra note 41.
47. Id. at 19.
48. Id. at 21.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2017).
50. BAUGHMAN, supra note 41 at 21–22.
51. Wykstra, supra note 20.
52. Rachel Smith, Condemned to Repeat History? Why the Last Movement for Bail Reform Failed, and
How This One Can Succeed, 25 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL’ Y 451, 454451 (2018).
53. Id. at 451.
54. BAUGHMAN, supra note 41 at 23.
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appearance of the person as required.”55 The idea was that judges would consider
alternatives to detention when deciding whether to incarcerate someone pretrial. 56
Although the law did not explicitly authorize judges to consider risk when
determining bail, it allowed judges to weigh the evidence against the defendant
pretrial to determine whether to grant bail and at what amount. 57 The Court did
not perceive the practice of weighing evidence of guilt pretrial as punishment. 58
Instead, its acceptance of the practice framed pretrial detention as serving the
legitimate and compelling government interest of protecting the public. 59
Ultimately, the law counteracted the positive effects it could have had on the
increasing pretrial detention levels which it sought to reduce. 60
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 embraced the practices that emerged through
previous bail reform efforts.61 The law authorized courts to “preventively detain
defendants pretrial where they found bail would not ‘reasonably assure [a
defendant’s] appearance . . . or [would] endanger the safety of any other person
or the community.’”62 The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the
law in United States. v. Salerno, holding that pretrial detention is not necessarily
punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. 63 Furthermore, the
Court held that the government’s interest in community safety can, under some
circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest. 64 According to the
Court, the Act provided sufficient procedural safeguards for a judge to accurately
determine the future dangerousness of a defendant to satisfy Due Process under
the Constitution. 65
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 allowed judges to consider the potential
dangerousness of a defendant.66 Despite variations in how judges make bail
decisions, the Bail Reform Act was the last landmark piece of national bail
reform legislation in the United States and continues as the status quo. 67
Consequently, bail determinations, even in the absence of cash bail, continue to
disproportionately affect the poor, people of color, and the communities to which
those people belong.68

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

§ 3142).
BAUGHMAN, supra note 41 at 24.
Id.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987).
Id. at 749.
BAUGHMAN, supra note 41 at 27.
Wykstra, supra note 20.
Kelleher, supra note 42 at 804.
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748.
Id. at 740.
Id.
Wykstra, supra note 20.
Id.
HUM . RTS. WATCH, supra note 2 at 2.
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B. Cash Bail, Pretrial Detention, and Their Negative Impact on Families and
Communities
Understanding why laws such as SB 10 that promise reductions in
unnecessary pretrial detention, but do not deliver requires comprehending the
cash bail system’s negative consequences and how they arise.69 Additionally, an
understanding of these issues demonstrates why Congress and society in general
should embrace other methods of addressing these drawbacks. 70 Proponents of
the cash bail system argue that it leads to greater pretrial accountability and
creates incentives for a person to appear at trial.71 However, the evidence
presents a much more complex reality. 72 Under this reality, the cash bail system
has increased pretrial detention rates because various factors adversely affect
outcomes in cases of those who cannot afford bail. 73
Between 1999 and 2014, the number of people held in pretrial detention
accounted for 99% of the jail population growth. 74 Additionally, on any day, 60%
of the jail population is awaiting trial. 75 As of 2017, local jails across the country
hold around 465,000 people awaiting trial.76 Of those detained, the median bail
amount is around $10,000 with states such as California imposing average bail
amounts of around $50,000.77 Further, even smaller bail amounts become
prohibitively expensive when, as of 2015, the average inmate earned only
$15,109 prior to incarceration, and the median bail amount equals eight months
income for the average detained defendant. 78 As a result, the U.S. criminal justice
system detains hundreds of thousands of people without regard to their guilt or

69. Infra Section III.C.
70. Infra Part VI.
71. Jazmine Ulloa, Bail Bond Industry Moves to Block Sweeping California Law, Submitting Signatures
for a 2020 Ballot Referendum, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-bailreferendum-signatures-20181120-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
72. Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5–7 (Apr. 2016).
73. Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson, & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor
Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 722 (Mar. 2017) (identifying factors that create poor outcomes for
bailees including increased incentives to plead guilty, inability to prepare a defense, reduced financial resources
available for defense, no ability to demonstrate positive behavior, inability to obstruct the prosecution, and a
lack of the advantage of long delay).
74. Peter Wagner, Jails Matter. But Who Is Listening?, PRISON POL’ Y INITIATIVE (Aug. 14, 2015),
https://prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/08/14/jailsmatter/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
75. JUST. POL’Y I NST., supra note 44.
76. Wendy Sawyer, How Does Unaffordable Money Bail Affect Families?, PRISON POL’ Y INITIATIVE
(Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2018/08/15/pretrial/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
77. HUM. RTS. WATCH, “NOT IN IT FOR JUSTICE”: HOW CALIFORNIA’S PRETRIAL DETENTION AND BAIL
SYSTEM
UNFAIRLY
PUNISHES
POOR
PEOPLE
34
(2017),
available
at
https://hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/usabail0417_web_0.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
78. Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Detaining the Poor: How Money Bail Perpetuates an Endless
Cycle of Poverty and Jail Time, PRISON POL’ Y INITIATIVE 2 (May 10, 2016),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/incomejails.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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innocence. 79
Progressive reformers across the nation agree both that cash bail does not
work80 and that pretrial detention serves to disadvantage those communities
comprising poor people and people of color. 81 Additionally, reformers also
agree—perhaps differing as to what degree—that the use of pretrial detention
directly drives mass incarceration by depriving communities of valuable
resources they need to succeed. 82 A 2015 report from the Ella Baker Center for
Human Rights found that pretrial incarceration generates economic instability
and a lack of mobility for inmates and their families by saddling them with fees,
fines, and debts that accrue during incarceration. 83 Adding to that financial
hardship, incarceration eliminates a wage earner and makes it impossible to
satisfy basic needs while attending to the accumulating costs of defending one’s
innocence. 84 With the average debt-load associated with court fees and fines
amounting to over $13,000,85 some released defendants and their families turn to
crime to make ends meet; interestingly, over 40% of all crimes are directly
attributable to poverty and 80% of inmates are low-income. 86
In addition to the financial strain that pretrial incarceration places on inmates
and their families, such detention has detrimental effects on the mental health and
general well-being of those families. 87 First, pretrial detention generally places a
majority of the familial responsibility on the spouses, partners, and other family
members of the detained person.88 They become responsible not only for
providing for themselves and the family, but also for ensuring the release of the
defendant.89 Additionally, the high cost of phone calls and visits, especially for
those who do not live near their loved one’s place of incarceration, make the
maintenance of a meaningfully sustaining emotional relationship prohibitively

79. Id. at 1.
80. Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 492 (2018).
81.
Essie Justice Group, Open Letter to the Bail Industry (Aug. 14, 2018),
http://essiejusticegroup.org/2018/08/open-letter-to-the-bail-industry (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (statement signed by 28 grassroots organizations opposing California’s bail reform legislation)
(“‘Good bail reform” leads to less incarceration. . . reduces racial disparities in the criminal justice system. . .
[and] has no direct cost to individuals and families. . . .”).
82. Id.
83. SANETA DEVUONO-POWELL, CHRIS SCHWEIDLER, ALICIA WALTERS, & AZADEH ZOHRABI, WHO
PAYS? THE TRUE COST OF INCARCERATION ON FAMILIES 7 (2015), http://whopaysreport.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/Who-Pays-FINAL.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 9.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 11.
88. See generally MEGAN COMFORT, DOING TIME TOGETHER: LOVE AND FAMILY IN THE SHADOW OF
PRISON 9–11 (2009) http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uopacific/detail.action?docID=432206 (detailing her
interactions with the female partners of male inmates and identifying the way in which “secondary
prisonization” affects those women even though they themselves are not incarcerated); DE VUONO-POWELL,
supra note 83 at 11.
89. Id. at 9.
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expensive. 90
III. CALIFORNIA’S RESPONSE AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
In 2016, Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, Tani Cantil-Sakauye,
established a working group to study California’s bail system to generate
recommendations for California’s legislature to ameliorate the state’s bail
system. 91 The report found that California’s system “unnecessarily compromises
victim and public safety because it bases a person’s liberty on financial resources
rather than the likelihood of future criminal behavior and exacerbates
socioeconomic disparities and racial bias.”92
The report highlighted several aforementioned problems and recognized that
the bail system could affect many aspects of a person’s life including,
employment, housing, childcare, and healthcare.93 Furthermore, the report
emphasized the fact that whether a person can pay bail affects the outcome of the
case and the sentence. 94 As a result, many defendants, regardless of guilt, plead
guilty in order to obtain release and avoid the collateral consequences of their
arrest.95
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and the working group recommended that the
legislature replace the use of cash bail with RAS.96Such systems utilize
algorithms to determine whether a defendant is too dangerous for release from
detention.97 The authors of SB 10 heeded this recommendation and made RAS
the foundation of SB 10, leading many to wonder whether the law would serve to
address the cash bail system’s problems. 98 Part A provides a brief overview of
SB 10.99 Parts B and C then show that, despite the potential for some benefit, the
law’s reliance on RAS serves to replicate the effects that occurred under the cash
bail system, but perhaps with even greater alleged legitimacy. 100
A. Overview of SB 10
Signed into law August 28, 2018 and originally slated to take effect on
90. Id. at 7.
91. PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM—RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 1 (2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 13.
94. Id. at 13–14.
95. Id. at 14.
96. Id. at 51.
97. Id. at 53.
98. Jeremy B. White, California Ended Cash Bail. Why Are so Many Reformers Unhappy About It?,
POLITICO (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/29/california-abolish-cash-bailreformers-unhappy-219618 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
99. Infra Section III.A.
100. Infra Sections III.B–C.
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October 1, 2019, SB 10 set out to eliminate the cash bail system in California. 101
Under the law, the California pretrial release system moves from a money-based
system to a risk-based release and detention system with the goal of releasing a
defendant with “the least restrictive nonmonetary condition or combination of
conditions that will reasonably assure public safety and the defendant’s return to
court.” 102 To determine whether a court can release a defendant in a manner that
will “reasonably assure public safety,” SB 10 mandates the implementation of
risk assessment systems across California.103
Although many California counties already use RAS to set bail amounts,
sentencing, and make other decisions,104 under SB 10, those systems would
determine if a person is considered low, medium, or high risk and, therefore,
whether conditions exist to reasonably release him into the public. 105 Critics of
the law’s language argue that it results in an unconstitutional presumption of
detention for individuals deemed high-risk and it potentially allows the detention
of virtually anyone pretrial.106
In addition, these opposition groups criticize the lack of standards the law
creates for determining what qualifies as low, medium, or high risk. 107
Furthermore, because of the nature of RAS, it is difficult to monitor whether the
system accounts for implicit bias because of empirical limitations and
inconsistencies among counties. 108 The fact that the pretrial assessment services
will not be independent from probation services compounds this problem. 109
101. S.B. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (enacted) (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 27771).
102. Id.
103. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.7 (enacted by Chapter 1.5) (West).
104. Erwin Chemerinsky, Improve SB 10, Don’t Eliminate It, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 27, 2019),
https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/california-forum/article225032170 (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review); see also Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57, 71–72 (Oct. 2018) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law School) (highlighting the California Rules of Court that have “allowed courts to
consider risk assessment information in determining the length and conditions of an individual’s period of
mandatory supervision”).
105. S.B. 10, supra note 101.
106. Jeff Adachi, Proposed California Money Bail Bill Will Set Back Reform Effort, S.F. CHRON. (Aug.
14, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/Proposed-California-money-bail-bill-willset-back-13156297.php (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Eric Westervelt, California’s
Bail Overhaul May Do More Harm Than Good, Reformers Say, NPR (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/02/651959950/californias-bail-overhaul-may-do-more-harm-than-good-reformerssay (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Under SB 10, now prosecutors can see detention
for virtually any crime. . ..Regardless of whether it’s violent or involves weapons or whether the person accused
has a prior history. Under this law prosecutors have the discretion to seek pre-emptive detention of a person
with no criminal record charged with a low-level misdemeanor”).
107. John Raphling, Human Rights Watch Comments on California Judicial Council Bail Reform Rules,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/10/human-rights-watch-commentscalifornia-judicial-council-bail-reform-rules (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
108. Note, S.B. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018): California Replaces Money-Bail System
with Pretrial Detention System, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2103–04 (2019).
109. SV De-Bug, Silicon Valley De-Bug’s Letter of Opposition to California’s False Bail Reform Bill
(SB10), DE -BUG (Aug. 14, 2018), https://siliconvalleydebug.org/stories/silicon-valley-de-bug-s-letter-ofopposition-to-california-s-false-bail-reform-bill-sb10 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review);
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Although the Judicial Council proposed a rule that would suggest that pretrial
services consult with community organizations as “appropriate,” the language
provides no definition for what constitutes as “appropriate” and makes the course
of action discretionary instead of mandatory. 110 The combination of these effects
leads the opponents of SB 10 to believe that it will not produce its intended
results.111
B. Referendum
Article II, Section 9, of the California Constitution provides for a referendum
process whereby electors have the power to approve or reject legislation that state
representatives have passed.112 In order to qualify to appear on a future ballot,
those seeking a referendum must receive signatures in a number equal to five
percent of the ballots cast for Governor in the last gubernatorial race. 113 They
must also file the necessary petitions with county election officials. 114
In January of 2019, supporters of the bail industry did just that and qualified
a referendum to appear on the November 3, 2020 General Election ballot. 115
Accordingly, SB 10 will not take effect in October of 2019 until voters decide
whether to adopt the law.116 Furthermore, California will not adopt the rules SB
10 requires the Judicial Council of California to produce to aid in the
implementation of SB 10 until after the referendum process. 117
In a state with over 3000 bail bondsmen, the referendum’s proponents had no
problem achieving well over the 365,880 required signatures to postpone and
possibly defeat the law’s implementation. 118 These people argue that the law
would decimate the two billion dollar national bail industry and lead to the
release of violent offenders who could harm the public.119 The industry managed
to gather these signatures as well as over three million dollars in only two
months—no small feat—which suggests that cash bail supporters could pose a

Statement of Opposition to Senate Bill 10, ESSIE JUSTICE GROUP (Aug. 14, 2018),
http://essiejusticegroup.org/2018/08/essie-justice-group-withdraws-support-for-sb-10/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
110. Ralphling, supra note 107.
111. ESSIE JUSTICE GROUP , supra note 109; SV De-Bug, supra note 109; Raphling, supra note 107.
112. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9.
113.
Referendum, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, https://sos.ca.gov/selections/ballotmeasures/referendum/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
114. Id.
115. Ulloa, supra note 29.
116. Michael McGough, The Fate of California’s Cash Bail Industry Will Now Be Decided on the 2020
Ballot,
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(Jan.
17.
2019),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/article224682595.html (available online at The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
117. Ulloa, supra note 29.
118. McGough, supra note 116.
119. Ulloa, supra note 29.
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formidable opposition to SB 10.120
C. Risk Assessment Systems and Implicit Bias
Although SB 10’s author is confident it will become the “law of the land,” 121
the bail bonds industry is not the only group opposed to SB 10 as Governor
Brown signed it into law.122 Civil rights groups and other organizations, such as
the American Civil Liberties Union, support overhauling the bail system, but
they do not support the bill’s presumption of preventive detention. 123 Critics
argue that the RAS that SB 10 utilizes reinforces various societal biases—based
on race, economics, and gender—that the systems inevitably reproduce. 124
Although SB 10’s author introduced a subsequent proposition that would require
counties to gather data regarding how they implement SB 10,125 many believe the
system’s users cannot account for the implicit bias inherent in the systems,
especially when judges rely solely on these assessments as they can under SB
10.126
The nationwide trend has generally been employing RAS instead of cash bail
to determine who presents a high enough risk where the system can reasonably
detain people before trial without offending notions of due process or equal
protection.127 However, because the use of RAS is relatively new, much
speculation and relatively little data has arisen concerning the merits of such
systems. 128 Reviewing the data from states that have relied heavily on RAS, such
states as New Jersey and Kentucky, may offer insight into the efficacy and
desirability of RAS.129
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Infra Part V.
123. Daisy Vieyra, ACLU of California Changes Position to Oppose Bail Reform Regulation, ACLU S.
CAL. (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.aclusocal.org/en/press-releases/aclu-california-changes-position-opposebail-reform-legislation (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
124. Ulloa, supra note 29.
125. S.B. 36, 2018 Leg., 2018–2019 Sess. (Cal. 2019).
126. Sam Levin, Imprisoned by Algorithms: The Dark Side of California Ending Cash Bail, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/sep/07/imprisoned-by-algorithms-the-dark-side-ofcalifornia-ending-cash-bail (on file with The University of the Pacific Law School) (“There is no evidence
suggesting that these kinds of algorithms have produced positive changes when implemented, said Megan T.
Stevenson, a George Mason University Professor who studied risk assessment. . . .”); but see Erwin
Chemerinsky, Improve SB 10, Don’t Eliminate It, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 27, 2019),
https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/california-forum/article225032170.html (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (“No matter the fate of SB 10, SB 36 is important in seeking to improve outcomes and
transparency in pretrial risk assessment tools and practices”).
127. See Glen Dalakian, Open the Jail Doors, Hal: A Guarded Embrace of Pretrial Risk Assessment
Instruments, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 325, 350 (Oct. 2018) (arguing that “policymakers should experiment with
risk assessment instruments as a component of their bail reform efforts, but only if appropriate safeguards are in
place”).
128. Id. at 328.
129. See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, BAIL REFORM: A
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Groups that oppose using RAS, or at least complete dependence on RAS,
argue that these systems will generate the same racial and wealth biases that
current bail systems create because those algorithms already reflect those
biases.130 Although the inability to pay bail would not prevent a court from
releasing a person, a court can consider several factors including age, crime
charged, neighborhood, and prior criminal history without regard to any other
mitigating circumstances depending on how the court utilizes its RAS. 131 As
jurisdictions around the country increase their reliance on RAS and move toward
eliminating cash bail, concerns arise that these systems often neglect to
sufficiently consider the rights of the defendant as a matter of both law and
policy.132 Although these concerns likely prevent grassroots organizations and
other civil rights groups from supporting SB 10, they almost certainly will not
join the bail industry to preserve the status quo: using cash bail and pretrial
detention.133 Instead, these groups will likely focus efforts on other methods of
bail reform that generate more tangible and immediate results. 134

IV. COMMUNITY-BASED DEFENSE
In conversations concerning criminal justice reform, political commentators
and reformers emphasize the middle and back ends of the system. 135 That is,
reformers stress providing services for incarcerated and newly-released
inmates.136 Many jurisdictions across the country have implemented such reforms
like providing incentives for early release to individuals presently incarcerated. 137
However, jurisdictions do not focus nearly as much energy on the front end of
GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL POLICY MAKERS 39, 44 (Feb. 2019), available at
cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/BailReform_WEB.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(discussing the principles of reform necessary to generate positive bail reform including a careful approach to
risk assessment systems).
130. Alexis Wilson Briggs, Human Rights Watch Advises Against Using Profile-Based Risk Assessment
in Bail Reform, HUM . RTS. WATCH (July 17, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/17/human-rightswatch-advises-against-using-profile-based-risk-assessment-bail-reform# (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
131. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM H ARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 129 at 34.
132. Koepke, supra note 26 at 1806.
133. ACLU of Northern California Statement on Referendum to Repeal Bail Reform Legislation, ACLU
of Northern California (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.aclunc.org/news/aclu-northern-california-statementreferendum-repeal-bail-reform-legislation (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
134. Infra Part VI.
135. See German Lopez, The First Step Act, Congress’s Criminal Justice Reform Bill, Explained, VOX
(Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/12/3/18122392/first-step-act-criminal-justicereform-bill-congress (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (highlighting the main features of
the most recent criminal justice reform bill, which focuses primarily on sentencing reform).
136. German Lopez, Congress’s Prison Reform Bill, Explained, VOX (May 22, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/5/22/17377324/first-step-act-prison-reform-congress (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
137. Id.
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the system where people first engage with the criminal justice system. 138
Part A of this section highlights the rise of innovative bail reform tactics in
the early 1990s.139 Parts B and C focus on community-based defense and
community-based organizations and highlight the positive effects such
approaches to bail reform have on the community and on the public. 140
A. A Shift in Bail Reform
The most recent efforts in bail reform have emphasized offering direct
community services to the accused and their families prior to trial.141 Probation
and Pretrial services, the community corrections arm of the federal judiciary,
often provides these services 142 However, the existence of such services outside
of the control of law enforcement is necessary for those services’ continued
success.143 But, independence is difficult because taxpayers are less willing to
pay for pre-conviction social services than for law enforcement under which
services after release are generally included. 144 Due to these limitations,
community-based reform has emerged as a viable method of addressing the bail
systems in the United States.145 Because of their flexibility, adaptability, and
willingness to address the root causes of mass incarceration and the failures of
our criminal justice systems, these community-based organizations represent the

138. Eli Hager & Bill Keller, Everything You Know About Mass Incarceration is Wrong: Or At Least
Misleading, Says this Contrarian Scholar. Here’s Why It Matters., THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 09, 2017),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/02/09/everything-you-think-you-know-about-mass-incarceration-iswrong (on file with The University of the Pacific law Review) (“Most reform efforts focus on getting people out
of prison by shortening or abolishing minimum sentences, hastening the work of parole boards, awarding
‘earned time’ for good behavior, and the like”).
139. Infra Section IV.A.
140. Infra Sections IV.B–C.
141. See, e.g., Zach Despart, Proposed Bail Lawsuit Settlement Includes Child Care, Phones, Rides for
Poor Defendants, HOUSTON CHRON. (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houstontexas/houston/article/Proposed-bail-lawsuit-settlement-includes-child-13764225.php (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (highlighting the settlement in a court case that required the county to
provide various pretrial services to assist defendants in appearing).
142. US COURTS , PROBATION & PRETRIAL SERVICES—MISSION, https://www.uscourts.gov/servicesforms/probation-and-pretrial-services/probation-and-pretrial-services-mission (last visited Dec. 15, 2018).
143. N AT’ L INST. OF CORRECTIONS , A FRAMEWORK FOR PRETRIAL JUSTICE: ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF
EFFECTIVE
PRETRIAL
SYST.
&
AGENCY
32
(Feb.
2017),
available
at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/pdr-nat-researcha_framework_for_pretrial_justice_essential_elements_of_an_effective_pretrial_system_and_agnecy.pdf (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
144. See, e.g., Jacob Ogles, Study Predicts High Costs for Pre-Trial Release, FLAPOL (Mar. 24, 2019),
https://floridapolitics.com/archives/291696-university-tampa-pre-trial-release291696 (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (demonstrating the fear that some people have regarding the elimination
of the bail bonds industry and the possibility of taxpayers having to pay for pretrial services).
145. See Matt Sledge, Community Bail Fund for Poor Defendants To Launch In Brooklyn, HUFFPOST
(Mar. 23, 2015), available at https://www.huffpost.com/entry/brooklyn-community-bail-fund_n_6886836 (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the launch of the Brooklyn Community Bail
Fund, a nonprofit working in conjunction with the Brooklyn Defender Services to assist the pretrial process).
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most assured way to implement lasting changes in bail reform. 146
In the mid-1980s, when bail’s purpose moved from preventing flight risk to
preventing a defendant from committing further crimes, the Vera Institute
identified the issue that low-income individuals were unlikely to satisfy the
criteria necessary to demonstrate community ties to attain release and also were
unlikely to afford bail no matter the amount. 147 In response, Vera “sought to
create a pretrial supervision program so good that it [could] compete with jail–
one that [could] virtually guarantee that defendants under supervision [would]
neither abscond nor commit new crimes.”148
Although the approach raised concerns about the equivalence of pretrial
detention and intensive supervised release, it also afforded medium and high-risk
defendants the ability to avoid incarceration and its negative repercussions by
ensuring judges that—with proper treatment and training for the defendant—jail
time is unnecessary.149 Furthermore, it utilized government funds in an
innovative way: shifting the spending to front-end prevention rather than to backend remedies.150 Ultimately, Vera changed functions as other advocacy groups
launched different projects to address bail, but not without first demonstrating
that community investment can assuage the concerns of law enforcement and
judicial officials over releasing potentially dangerous defendants back into the
community.151
B. Community-Bail Funds
Under the same model as the Vera Institute, the Bronx Freedom Fund
emerged as an outgrowth of the Institute’s work. 152 The fund works to provide
bail in the amount of $2,000 or less to defendants who can not afford it.153 The
organization created a charitable revolving bail fund in which it used the same
funds repeatedly to pay the bail of those who could not. 154 In 2017, the Bronx
Freedom Fund evolved into The Bail Project, a national organization with the

146. Supra Section III.C.
147. Andrea Clisura, None of Their Business: The Need for Another Alternative to New York’s Bail Bond
Business, 19 J.L. & POL’ Y 307, 322 (2010).
148. Id. at 323.
149. Id. at 324–25.
150. Id. at 325.
151. Logan Abernathy, Bailing Out: The Constitutional and Policy Benefits of Community and Nonprofit
Bail Funds, 42 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 85, 90 (2018) (arguing that community bail funds are the best way to
resolve competing interests).
152. Alan Feuer, Bronx Charity Founder Wants to Pay Bail for Poor Defendants Nationwide, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/nyregion/bail-project-fund-poor-defendants.html
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
153. Jaime Williams, Borough’s Charitable Bail Fund Touts Success, BRONX TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015),
https://www.bxtimes.com/stories/2015/9/09-fund-2015-02-27-bx_2015_9.html (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
154. Id.

16

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51
goal of securing freedom for as many people as possible utilizing the sort of
revolving bail fund that worked so effectively in the Bronx. 155 By organizing
under the model of a revolving bail fund, reformers can focus on specific
jurisdictions in need, recycling the monetary resources that various actors invest
in the project.156
Coordinating this movement through community-driven efforts instead of
through law enforcement organizations avoids the red tape associated with
government action and the political implications that often limit bail reform. 157
Although general community bail funds do not fully remedy the problems
associated with cash bail because not everybody is an ideal candidate to be bailed
out by such funds, they do represent a foundational change in the bail reform
movement. 158 They do so by transferring action and accountability to
communities that have a concrete interest in bail reform rather than leaving them
in the hands of disinterested politicians or those with only a tangential connection
to the issue. 159 Such funds can serve to address the problems associated with bail
by offering a solution during the transition period from cash bail to its
replacement, whatever that may be.160
C. Community-Based Organizations
United States law defines Community-Based Organizations (“CBOs”) as any
public or private nonprofit that “is representative of a community or significant
segments of the community” and “provides education or related services to
individuals in the community.”161 Aside from providing the actual money for
bail, the CBOs that evolved from Vera Institute’s model offer an excellent
example of how these organizations can serve the community—both the accused
and others—to reduce levels of incarceration.162 The Bronx Freedom Fund,
initially mentioned above, organized as the Bronx Defenders in 2007 to provide
bail to those unable to afford it by using a revolving bail fund.163 However, much
of the Fund’s success now exists in providing services to those for whom it
provides bail to ensure that those people appear for their court appearances after
155. Feuer, supra note 152.
156. See Abernathy, supra note 151 at 90–92 (explaining the way in which a community bail fund
functions).
157. Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 586, 637 (2017).
158. Alysia Santo, Bail Reformers Aren’t Waiting for Bail Reform, They’re Using Charity to Set Poor
Defendants
Free,
THE
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(Aug.
23,
2016),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/08/23/bail-reformers-aren-t-waiting-for-bail-reform (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
159. See Abernathy, supra note 151 at 94 (arguing that community bail funds are the best way to resolve
competing interests).
160. Infra Part IV.A.
161. 20 U.S.C.A § 7801(6) (West).
162. Simonson, supra note 157 at 590–92.
163. Clisura, supra 147 at 315.
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the fund posts bail.164 Such tactics allowed the organization to bail almost 150
people from October 2013 to October 2014, with 98% of those people making
their required court appearances. 165
Another fund, the Brooklyn Community Bail Fund, works with referring
agencies and other social service providers to give pretrial defendants access to
re-entry support including attorneys, housing and education workers, and
employment agencies.166 The Fund has kept over 4,000 people out of pretrial
detention where they would have been more likely to plead guilty and where they
would have had less access to defense-building strategies that could keep them
out of jail. 167 Ninety-five percent of all inmates for whom the Fund obtained
release made their appearances regardless of the level of risk the court found
those defendants to pose. 168 Additionally, courts were three times more likely to
dismiss those defendants’ charges, and the defendants received more favorable
outcomes than if they did not have help from the fund. 169
Although a number of jurisdictions implement social services following a
person’s conviction, few provide pre-trial services that serve to prevent the initial
interactions with the criminal justice system that often start an endless and
repetitive process of incarceration. 170 Furthermore, in those that do, it is parole
entities and other government bodies run by law enforcement that offer such
services.171 CBOs can tailor the social services they offer to address varied
individual community needs and take action in response to community voices
because CBOs comprise people that the criminal justice system has directly
affected.172
Additionally, for people without ties to the community and with no way for a
defendant to demonstrate to a judge that she should release him before trial, these
groups can intervene to provide the necessary ties and services to demonstrate to

164. The Bronx Freedom Fund, One Year Report 2 (Nov. 2014).
165. Id.
166. BROOKLYN DEFENDERS, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2016), available at https://bds.org/wpcontent/uploads/BDS-2016-Annual-Report.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
167. BROOKLYN COMMUNITY BAIL FUND, https://brooklynbailfund.org/our-results-1 (last visited Nov.
15, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See generally Amber Taylor, A Free Start: Community-Based Organization as an Antidote to the
Mass Incarceration of Women Pretrial, 26 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 51 (2015) (detailing how inadequate
pretrial services and defense often lead to longer sentences and future recidivism).
171. See PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, PROMISING PRACTICES IN PROVIDING PRETRIAL SERVICES
FUNCTIONS WITHIN PROBATION AGENCIES: A USER’S GUIDE 13 (June 2010) (“In recent years, many [. . .]. . .
programs have merged with probation, leaving only 22 of the 94 federal districts where pretrial services and
probation are separate”) available at https://www.appa-net.org/eweb/docs/appa/pubs/PPPPSFWPA.pdf (on file
with The University of the Pacific School of Law).
172. Taylor, supra note 170 at 59. (arguing that individual-led provisions of service focusing on the
tailoring of support to the individual needs of a defendant most effectively accomplish the goals of pretrial
detention and bail).
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that judge that release is not only tenable, but also desirable. 173 These groups
demonstrate that in communities where individuals participate and maintain a
stake in the well-being of the community’s citizens, less law enforcement is
necessary, and, incarceration both pre and post-trial decreases.174
V. CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS
Despite the clear success that many CBOs have had throughout the country
in providing direct pretrial services and funds to the accused pretrial, the inability
of those groups to gain the support of local and state officials has stymied such
action.175 Today, CBOs function in a number of different ways; in some
jurisdictions, local legislatures channel funding to community bail funds and
other non-profits that work in tandem with local public defenders to provide the
services detailed in the previous section. 176 In others, the legislature promulgates
laws that facilitate community bail funds and other forms of community defense
and rehabilitation by permitting the funds to post bail whereas other state laws
would have denied them that right.177
For example, the state lawmakers enacted the New York Charitable Bail Act
of 2012 to allow non-profit organizations in New York to pay bail in the amount
of $2,000 or less for those defendants that cannot afford it. 178 The legislature
passed the law in direct response to a court decision where the judge rejected the
Bronx Freedom Fund’s posted bail because he was concerned with the unknown
identities of the individuals who provided the bail. 179 The legislation allowed the
Brooklyn Bail Fund to continue evolving to serve the community’s needs, while
removing obstacles, like the court decision above, that prevent community
organizers from doing their work. 180
Many are concerned about defendants using nontraditional sources to pay
bail.181 As a result, some commentators claim these crowdfunding sources, such
173. Simonson, supra note 157 at 605–06.
174. Id. at 606.
175. E.g., Raven Rakia, New Orleans Prosecutor Calls New Bail Fund ‘Extremely Disturbing,’ THE
APPEAL (Nov. 28, 2018), https://theappeal.org/new-orleans-da-stokes-fears-over-bail-fund/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (highlighting New Orleans district attorney’s criticism of community bail
group as “playing a very dangerous game with public safety”).
176. BDS Memo of Support of A4880, Which Would Limit Restrictions on Charitable Bail
Organizations (CBOS), Brooklyn Defender Services (Feb. 9, 2017), https://bds.org/bds-memo-of-support-ofa4880-which-would-limit-restrictions-on-charitable-bail-organizations-cbos/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review); see also Simonson, supra note 157 at 600–02 (providing examples of various community
bail funds and the way in which they function).
177. See Simonson, supra note 157 at 600–02 (providing examples of various community bail funds and
the way in which they function).
178. Susan Loeb, Go Fund Me, Please: Crowdsourcing for Bail as an Insufficient Surety, 44 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1319, 1331 (2016).
179. Id.
180. Simonson, supra note 157 at 642.
181. See generally Loeb, supra note 178 (explaining the reservations related to and problems associated
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as Go Fund Me, are illegitimate bail sources. 182 Conversations surrounding cash
bail sources beyond traditional bondsmen often center around the argument that a
person will not feel the same obligation to appear if someone with whom the
person has no connection pays the bail insuring his appearance. 183 Although this
argument is initially compelling, it doubly disadvantages indigent
defendants;184indigent defendants are likely unable to afford even a small amount
of bail, and they are unlikely to have any meaningful connection to the
community to which they belong.185
Bail funds, CBOs, and other methods of community defense assuage these
concerns by providing the community connection the defendant previously
lacked. 186 Focusing on community defense allows groups to combat the notion
that dangerous defendants will not appear at trial and will commit crimes in the
interim. 187 This should demonstrate to courts the strong likelihood of the
defendant’s appearance at trial without employing the use of pretrial detention. 188
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENSURING COMMUNITY ACCESS TO AND IMPACT
ON THE BAIL REFORM CONVERSATION
A system relying on community defense would ideally task legislatures with
developing standards to determine the legitimacy of bail that comes from
individuals and from charitable bail funds. 189 This is because some argue that
“bail funds may [] usurp the traditional democratic process.” 190 However, most
states have already enacted those regulations for commercial bail bonds
businesses, so a regulatory model already exists191 A gradual erosion of the bail
industry by removing for-profit bail businesses would help the bail reform
movement gain further traction by eliminating a large impediment to the political
success of cash bail reform.192 Weakening of the bail bonds industry would, in

with permitting the use of crowdsourcing, and why certain states might choose to prohibit such sources of bail).
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turn, release some pressure on legislators from a billion-dollar industry.193
Part A of this section demonstrates that by enacting regulations that allow
certain groups to provide bail and other bail services, local legislatures can ease
the weight on their own coffers while providing bail reformers the capital they
need to run as successful ventures.194 Furthermore, such regulations would
address concerns regarding donations coming from legitimate sources. 195 These
regulations would allow CBOs and other bail funds to more seamlessly enter the
political process to impact meaningful bail reform. 196 Part B then highlights a
model through which local jurisdictions could address bail reform until voters
decide SB 10’s fate.197
A. California’s Neglect of Community-Based Organizations in Implementing Bail
Reform and Its Need for Their Input
To illustrate, a coalition of nine groups representing different stakeholders
originally supported California’s SB 10.198 By the time Governor Brown signed
the bill into law, almost all the CBOs that initiated the law’s ascent withdrew
their support for it.199 They cited cooption by the bill’s authors and the remaining
groups that supported the authors’ conception of the bill. 200
Such groups as Essie Justice Group argue that reform done in the name of
low-income black and brown people should substantively help those people. 201
However, because the voices most dedicated to the plight of that demographic
were shut out of the legislative process, the law Governor Brown signed does not
reflect their views.202 As such, the groups that once represented a driving
coalition in California’s bail reform movement are no longer working in tandem,
leaving them without the force necessary to drive lasting change and placing the
success of such bold reform movements as SB 10 in a precarious position. 203
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However, in an effort to assuage some of the concerns of these grassroots
organizations, Governor Brown signed SB 10 into law as an implementation bill,
with the California Judicial Council to prescribe the rules of implementation. 204
At the end of 2018, the Council produced its first set of draft rules for public
comment with the hope of garnering more support for the bill. 205 One such
provision would “require[] courts to. . .consult with local resource providers, as
appropriate, including the county behavioral health agency and community-based
organizations that provide support for defendants and for victims. . .” in
implementing the new system of pretrial detention. 206
Although the remaining language of the draft rules leaves much unsettled, a
change to this provision could allow access to the process from which SB 10
ultimately excluded certain community-based organizations.207 By including
language requiring local courts and other criminal justice system actors to consult
community-based organizations continuously and not only “as appropriate,” the
judicial council’s rules could garner much more support than the language of the
proposed rules.208 The current language, according to critics, would allow local
jurisdictions to bypass working with these organizations or to limit the amount of
input that they have in developing the systems that each jurisdiction will use. 209
Such a system likely would lead to a neglect of defendant’s rights which, as
demonstrated above, does not serve to protect the community or the defendant. 210
Rules requiring consultation with CBOs, however, would give the entire system
more legitimacy by ensuring that political actors respond to all voices so that the
movement represents more competing interests and nuanced views.211
B. Moving Forward
Because SB 10 will not go into effect until after November 2020, if at all,
reformers need to continue brainstorming solutions to the problems cash bail
causes if the reform movement wants to avoid stalling.212 Governor Newsom,
who allocated 75 million dollars in his budget to the Judicial Council in its efforts
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to aid in implementing SB 10,213 should also allocate money to the myriad
community-defense oriented groups that currently act within in the state to
ameliorate the conditions of those that bail affects, even as SB 10 is in limbo. 214
The chance encounter between the head deputy of the Compton Public
Defender’s Office, Jane Newman, and Robin Steinberg, the founder of the Bail
Project and the Bronx Defenders, serves as one such example of how the state
could accomplish this.215 After meeting, the two women managed to create a
three-way partnership under which the non-profit Bail Project will work with
UCLA’s law students and the Public Defender’s Office to implement
community-defense in which the partnership focuses on the defendant’s needs to
avoid any pretrial detention and its associated costs. 216 In the clinic, “students
work closely with their client’s families and community supporters to present
judges with whole pictures of their clients.” 217 In communities such as Compton,
where seven out of ten clients the public defender’s office represents cannot
afford bail, there is an obvious need for such collaboration. 218
The coalition has already secured the release of eleven of the fourteen people
they have helped. 219 Securing spots in drug programs, sending daily text
reminders to attend trial, and attaining the assurance of family members that they
would be responsible for their loved one’s appearance are some examples of how
these coalitions have secured pre-trial release for their clients.220 While these
methods do not always work because judges fear the consequences of releasing
defendants into the public without proper assurances, one person who avoids
unnecessary detention is one more person who will not experience the negative
effects of that detention which could be expansive. 221
Released individuals can maintain their daily routines for the days, months,
or even years until trial, allowing them to keep their jobs and care for their
children. 222 Even more, the founder of the Bail Project urges that over the ten
years she has been working on bail reform 96% of defendants have appeared for
trial.223 Such figures should assuage concerns from supporters of bail who fear
allowing defendants to rely on untraditional sources of bail will not hold them
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accountable to the court .224 Furthermore, the argument that the possibility of
getting one’s bail returned encourages appearances ignores the reality that most
bailees do not receive their money back and often lose that money to the bail
bondsmen regardless of whether they appear.225
Critics are concerned that this reformed system of addressing bail cannot
work in a state the size of California.226 They argue these programs would still be
costly. 227 However, even the Compton district attorney acknowledged that “the
program is an encouraging step away from what has long been the status quo in
L.A. County: If you have money, you bail yourself out; if you’re poor, you
don’t.”228 For too long, the state of California has let the bail industry control the
narrative surrounding pretrial defendants,229 and this is a chance to squash that
narrative.230
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the difficulties associated with relying on CBOs as the primary
driver of change, 231 the inclusion of legislation or judicial rules providing for the
financial support of and cooperation with these groups by local law enforcement
and other actors in the criminal justice system would reduce the disparity in bail
outcomes.232 Ultimately, by funding community-based organizations through
legislation and officially integrating them into the legal process whereby
defendants secure release prior to trial, California can harness the energy and
power of movements that already exist within the state and across the country to
more effectively accomplish the goals that SB 10 sought to achieve. 233
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